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Introduction
The privatisation of the rail system in Britain can be seen as 
the third, and most controversial, stage of a process which 
began with the Transport Act of 1980 and deregulation of express 
coach services in that year. This was followed by the 
deregulation of local bus services (apart from London and 
Northern Ireland) under the Transport Act of 1985, effective in 
1986. The interest generated in such changes was considerable, 
forming a significant element in the first 'Thredbo' conference 
in 1989, and similar gatherings since.  
The rail privatisation has been the most complex and extensive, 
due in part to the different nature of the industry, involving 
infrastructure as well as service operations, and freight as 
well as passenger. The government's own policy was often unclear 
in the early stages, as Shaw (1) has shown. The structure of the 
industry remains a subject for intense debate, especially the 
role of Railtrack (monopoly provider of infrastructure). 
There are many different aspects of rail privatisation, which 
have been explored by numerous authors. The main approach which 
I have adopted is to look at the net financial impact on the 
state, bringing together many aspects which might otherwise be 
considered separately (for example, changes in revenue, 
ridership, payments to franchise operators, income from sales of 
assets). It also leads on to consideration of net gains and 
losses to users, through changes in fares and service quality. 
Operator profitability is also a factor, since it determines the 
ability of the privatised train operating companies (TOCs) to 
sustain operations. 
This paper follows an  earlier piece of work reported to the 
1998 World Conference on Transport Research  (2) which examined 
the net financial impacts of rail privatisation, based on the 
known sale value of the privatised businesses, and the 
commitments made in the first round of passenger franchises (all 
of which, with one minor exception, were for seven years or 
more). It is now opportune to examine the outcome after the 
first four full years of franchised operation, in which much 
more is known of trends in ridership and financial performance. 
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As in the case of the express coach and local bus industries it 
is important to distinguish as far as possible the external 
factors which would affect performance of the industry apart 
from privatisation  and deregulation per se. For example, in the 
case of local buses an underlying negative trend might be 
expected due to rising car ownership, the question being the 
extent to  which ridership losses (in aggregate) were greater or 
lower than might be expected from this and other related causes. 
Conversely, in the case of the rail industry since privatisation 
the main external factors have been positive, notably growth in 
GDP and employment in central London. It is the sharp growth in 
express coach travel, of about 50% between 1980 and 1986, which 
is perhaps most obviously a direct positive consequence of 
deregulation, given the previous decline and absence of 
significant positive external factors during that period. 
It is also important to distinguish privatisation and 
deregulation effects separately. For example, the rapid growth 
in coach travel in the early 1980s occurred while the main 
operator (National Express) was still in state ownership, not 
being privatised until 1988. Local bus deregulation in October 
1986 applied with immediate effect, but privatisation of most of 
the industry took place over the following eight years. In the 
case of rail, the industry is wholly privatised but if anything 
is more regulated than before, notably in terms of service 
levels and fare controls. 
Structure of the industry
This is very complex, and well described elsewhere. A brief 
review is provided at this point to set the scene. Prior to 
privatisation, British Rail (BR) was an integrated organisation, 
providing both passenger and freight services. Passenger 
operations were grouped in three business sectors (Intercity, 
Network South East, and Regional Railways), who were also 
responsible for their infrastructure. The new structure 
comprises: 
25 TOCs, each covering a specific set of routes under a 
franchise agreed with the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA). They 
are largely monopolies within their own catchment areas, but 
some competition has emerged through prior existence of 
alternative routes (e.g. London to Birmingham) and a very 
limited amount of 'open access' operation permitted by the 
Regulator  (new services which compete with incumbents). 
Railtrack  PLC, owner of tracks, signalling, stations and other 
infrastructure, which charges TOCs and freight operators for 
access. It is responsible for maintenance and renewal of the 
existing infrastructure, but is now less likely to be involved 
in major enhancement. Railtrack was privatised by sale of shares 
to the public in May 1996. 
Rolling stock leasing companies (ROSCOs). Three main companies, 
privatised by direct sale in November 1995, which were 
subsequently resold to other businesses for about 50% more than 
the state secured initially. The existing fleet was split 
between these companies, initially with little price competition 
between them. TOCs obtain almost all their stock from these 
companies but can also purchase outright or lease from 
manufacturers for supply of new stock. 
Freight operating companies (FOCs). Most of the freight business 
was sold to English Welsh  and Scottish (EWS), then a subsidiary 
of Wisconsin Central. The other main operator is Freightliners, 
the rail container operator, sold to a management buy-out. In 
this paper the financial outcome in the freight sector is 
treated as neutral, the gains from sale of the companies by the 
state being largely offset by additional access grants (3). 
Apart from Gatwick Express, all TOCs required financial support 
at the start of the privatisation period. Most of this comes 
from central government via the SRA but in the seven major 
conurbations outside London, the local Passenger Transport 
Executives (PTEs) determine service levels and fares on rail 
services, and are responsible for the support payments to 
operators, which are included in totals shown later. 
Trends in passenger traffic
Table 1 shows trends in passenger traffic since 1989/90 up to 
the latest full  year for which figures are available, 
1999/2000. Passenger-km are used as the  preferred measure, 
since passenger trips may be subject to an element of double-
counting following separation of TOCs from the previous British 
Rail structure. In practice, the difference is fairly small : 
for example, 'passenger trips' rose from 812m in 1989-90 to 947m 
in 1999-2000, by 135m or 16.6% (4), compared with 15.0% for 
passenger-km. 
It can be seen that total ridership fell from a peak in 1989/90 
associated with a high level of economic activity in that year, 
to a low point in 1994/95. This was associated with a recession 
(which also affected other modes) and in 1994 itself by strike 
action (mainly affecting long-distance and regional operators). 
The overall volume then rose steadily at about 5% a year to a 
new peak of 38,300m in 1999/2000, an aggregate growth of 33.4% 
from 1994/95. 
This pattern varied by sector, the long-distance operators 
showing the smallest growth, both over the whole period (2.3%) 
and in the growth phase after 1994/95 (23.4%). The largest 
percentage growth over the whole period was in the regional 
operators (which cover some major interurban routes, and 
operations within all the conurbations outside London, as well 
as low-density rural services), of 33.9%.   Data published by 
SRA enables a fairly close matching with the three sectors 
previously found under the BR structure. Allowance for the 
transfer of Gatwick Express (a non-stop service between central 
London and Gatwick airport) from Intercity to regional increases 
the long-distance growth and reduces that for regional rail, but 
only to a  modest extent. 
Table 1   Passenger travel on national railways 1989/90 –
1999/00
Million passenger-km 
      of which: 
Year   Whole  Long-distance  London     Regional  
               network   operators       & S.E.     operators 
1989/90  33,600 12,900    15,200   5,600 
1990/91  33,200 12,700    14,900   5,600 
1991/92  32,500 12,600    14,300   5,500 
1992/93  31,700 12,200    13,600   5,900 
1993/94  30,400 11,400    13,200   5,800 
1994/95  28,700 10,700    12,900   5,000 
1995/96  30,000 11,100    13,300   5,600  
1996/97  32,100 n/a          n/a    n/a  
1997/98  34,700 12,300    15,500   6,800 
1998/99  36,300 12,600    16,500   7,200  
1999/2000  38,300 13,200    17,600   7,500  
Percentage change: 
1989/90 –  
1999/2000       +15.0%   +2.3%         +15.7%   +33.9% 
              (+3.9%*)     (+30.3%*)  
1994/95 –  
1999/2000       +33.4%  +23.4%         +36.4%   +50.0%   
     (+25.2%*)     (+46.0%*)   
Average trip  
length (km) 
in 1999/00  40.4  183.3          27.1    33.2  
* Percentage change after effect of reassigning Gatwick 
Express volume of 200m from regional to intercity in 
1999/2000. 
Data under the ‘long-distance operators’ from 1997/98 
comprises the franchises for Anglia (inter city services), 
GNER, Great Western, Midland Main Line, Virgin West Coast and 
Virgin Cross Country. For the period up to  1995/96 inclusive, 
it comprises the former ‘InterCity Sector’ of British Rail, 
broadly the same services but also including Gatwick Express 
(which carries about  200m passenger-km per year). London & 
S.E. (South East) comprises the franchises closely 
corresponding to the former Network South East (Chiltern, 
Connex South Central, Connex South Eastern, First Great 
Eastern, c2c (formerly LTS), Silverlink, South West Trains, 
Thames Trains, Thameslink, West Anglia Great Northern). 
‘Regional’ comprises all other operators (including Gatwick 
Express from 1997/98), including inter alia all PTE services. 
Source : National Rail Trends 2000-01, quarter 3. Strategic 
Rail Authority March 2001, tables 1.1a, 1.1b and page 24. 
Sector data up to 1995/96 inclusive is from Transport 
Statistics Great Britain 1996 edition, table 5.11(a), HMSO 
London September 1996 
Just over half the absolute growth in rail use over the whole 
period took place on the London & South East operators, and only 
about 6% on long-distance.  SRA data also indicates (5) that the 
proportion of demand attributed to season ticket use fell from 
32.7% to 27.4% over the whole period, although it did grow very 
substantially from the low point in 1994-95, representing 31.3% 
of the absolute network total growth between 1995-96 and 
1999/2000. It is concentrated largely  in the London and South 
East area, and correlated with employment levels in central 
London. Work by Lange (6) indicated that, on a year-by-year 
basis for the period 1975-1995, a significant relationship was 
found between GDP change and growth in total rail use, and also 
separately for InterCity and London & South East sectors - but 
not for regional, which was more strongly affected by local 
economic variations and service quality changes. 
It is clear that much of the recovery since 1994/95 is due to 
growth in GDP, stimulating travel in rail and other modes above 
the trends of the early 1990s. Work by DETR in connection with 
the ten-year  transport plan published in 2000 (7) indicates 
that a model calibrated on the period from  1978 for 'non 
commuting' traffic (i.e. non-season ticket travel) provides a 
very good fit both before and after rail privatisation based on 
the following approximate elasticities: 
GDP change     : +2 
Total car traffic    : -1 
Average real rail fares  : -1 
The 'car traffic' term is influenced both by changes in car 
ownership and factors affecting use of each car. The latter 
includes the effect of rising fuel costs due to the 'fuel tax 
escalator' up to 2000.  This model has also been used by DETR to 
forecast changes under the ten-year plan, implying that a 
further growth of about 40% would be quite plausible. The model 
did not find specific service  quality factors to be significant 
at the aggregate level, although train kilometres run had 
increased over the period. 
Diagram 1, reproduced by kind permission of DETR, shows the 
estimated non-season passenger volume from this model, and the 
actual outcome, giving a  very close fit, including the growth 
phase since privatisation. 
DETR were not able to calibrate a model with a good fit for 
commuting (i.e.  season ticket) traffic. However, in this case 
it would be even less likely that rail service quality has been 
a factor, given the lack of major investment in the period since 
privatisation (although medium-term growth might have been 
evident from the cross-London Thameslink service after its 
opening in 1988, and Chiltern route following its modernisation 
shortly before privatisation). Another factor in London & South 
East trends is the reinstallation of ticket barriers at busy 
stations, as operators have sought to reduce fraudulent travel. 
This would provide a 'growth' in use from those not previously 
paying the full price for their travel, as distinct from a 
change in travel patterns as such (8).  
Diagram 1 : Actual and predicted volumes of ‘non-season-
ticket’ rail demand.
Index, base 1998 = 100. 
Source : DETR (see text) 
Actual outcome is denoted by the black line and solid boxes, 
predicted by the grey line and open boxes. 
Rail privatisation per se thus does not emerge as a primary 
factor, and one can argue that much of the growth since 1994/95 
would have taken place is any case. However, an element of the 
regulatory framework  in the Railways Act 1993 has been 
important, namely the regulation of fares. Most season ticket 
and ‘Saver’ standard class travel was limited to average annual 
increases not exceeding the Retail Price Index (RPI) and from 
1999, an 'RPI-1' formula has applied. This directly covers about 
half the total traffic volume, the other half being in any case 
a price-elastic  market  dominated by discretionary travel and 
subject to modal competition. While real prices rose in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, average real revenue per passenger-km has 
remained almost unchanged  since 1995, at about 8.6-8.8p in 
1999/2000 prices (9). 
There is however an exception in the long-distance sector. Here, 
average revenue per passenger-km rose by about 8% in real terms 
between 1997/98 and 1999/2000 alone. A likely factor is the 
increases in ‘Super Saver’ fares, a category not regulated, 
which is a commonly used ‘walk on’ fare for personal leisure 
travel. While the range of low-price book ahead ‘APEX’ and 
similar tickets has widened, a user requiring  the same walk-on 
facility as before effectively pays a higher price. 
A  consequence of the overall stability in real revenue per 
passenger-km is that change in total revenue is closely 
correlated with changes in volume. Hence, real revenue growth of 
34.9% has occurred since 1994/95 (9), enabling TOCs to absorb 
reductions in franchise payments substantially from this cause, 
in aggregate terms. 
Support payments to passenger train operators
Table 2 shows support paid to passenger train operators from 
1990/91, adjusted to 1999/2000 prices. That for the years  to 
1995/96 was almost wholly to British Rail (apart from the last 
few weeks for 1995/96 in respect of South West Trains and Great 
Western franchises), 1996/97 a mix of BR and TOCs, and from 
1997/98 inclusive  entirely in franchise payments to TOCs. This 
corresponds to a  similar table in my 1998 paper in respect of 
the period to  1997/98 after allowing for retail price 
inflation. It can be seen that support increased in the early 
1990s, largely due to the recession and its effects on revenue. 
It then jumped very sharply, doubling between 1993/94 and 
1994/95, due to the internal restructuring of the railway 
industry prior to privatisation, in which Railtrack and ROSCOs 
were set up as separate companies (see discussion below). 
Commitments made by franchise operators then produced the drop 
to 1999/2000. Under their original commitments a steady drop 
would  have continued to 2002/03. At 1999/2000 prices, for 
example, they would have fallen to about £900m. 
However, it was clear that some very optimistic bids had been 
made, especially in the later stages of the franchising process. 
 Whereas the first two bids, by Stagecoach and Great Western 
Trains, may now be seen as relatively cautious, the later bids 
implied very large increases in revenue, given that operators 
directly control only around 30% to 40% of their costs. 
If the originally-anticipated sum of franchise payments to 
operators from 1997/98 is compared with the outcome, a further 
difference of about £125m per annum may be noted in terms of the 
public expenditure. This attributable to the fact that five PTEs 
opted to secure services on 'gross cost' contracts in which the 
operator is paid for services provided, while revenue is 
retained by the PTE  - as in the case of gross cost bus 
contracts described by Steve Tough and myself at the 1993 
Thredbo conference (10). In terms of total public spending, 
however, this may be 'netted off' against the PTE payments to 
the franchisees. For example, if a group of PTEs were supporting 
services in the public sector era which had a gross cost of 
£300m per annum and revenue of £100m, the net support would have 
been £200m. If these were then franchised on a gross cost basis 
to TOCs, the payment to the TOCs would have been £300m (ignoring 
any cost changes), but in terms of net public expenditure this 
would still have been offset by the £100m revenue retained by 
the PTEs.  
In addition to the base revenue levels at 1995/96, some of the 
PTE networks have recovered from earlier low levels of traffic, 
and West Yorkshire in particular has benefited from strong 
growth in Leeds. In practice, the net payments made by PTEs fell 
by about £91m (23%) in real terms between 1995/96 and 1999/2000 
(11), presumably a  mix of cost reductions, revenue growth and 
any losses absorbed by franchisees where reductions in payments 
were faster than these factors would permit. 
Table 2 also shows adjusted figures for 2000/01 to 2002/03 
inclusive. In contrast to the originally-expected outcome, 
certain franchises have been renegotiated following financial 
difficulties represented by their owners, and reflecting the 
earlier over-optimism in bids for some regional operations: 
Merseyrail Electrics and Northern Spirit (operating urban 
services within Merseyside, and an extensive network in north 
east England). These were originally gained by MTL (the main bus 
operator on Merseyside). Following its sale to the larger Arriva 
group in  February  2000,  the latter originally was committed 
to continue the franchises for only one more year. Subsequently, 
after renegotiation with the SRA,  Northern Spirit will receive 
£55m than originally agreed for 2001/02, and Merseyrail £9m 
(12).    
In a similar case, Prism (a business set up by group of bus 
executives holding four rail franchises) ran into difficulties 
with its Cardiff Valleys, and Wales & West franchises. Prism 
sold out to National Express (now the largest rail franchisee), 
with arrangements that these two would be surrendered. In 
practice, a  revised agreement was reached between NE and the 
SRA, increasing Wales & West's payments for the 9 months to 31 
December 2001 by £38m, and Cardiff Valleys by £11m (13). 
Finally, First North Western, covering the north west region, is 
incurring substantial losses. An arrangement was recently made 
in which it repaid £37m to the SRA (the discounted equivalent of 
expected future losses), but will then receive an extra £20m 
p.a. in 2001-03 while operations in the area are restructured 
(14).
Within table 2, an extra £150m p.a. has been added (at 1999/2000 
prices) for 2001-03 to allow for these changes. In practice, 
some other regional companies are also in difficulty, and 
further renegotiation may be required.   
The SRA has also brought forward the process of renegotiating 
existing franchises prior to their original  termination dates, 
even where operations are profitable, as part of its longer-term 
approach. Agreements in principle have been reached for Chiltern 
and South West Trains (retained by their existing franchisees) 
and South Central (transferring from Connex (Vivendi) to GoVia 
this month). However, profiles of expected cash flows are not 
yet available. 
For purposes of long-run calculations  I have assumed that the 
figure of £1050m net support per annum will continue to apply 
from 2003/4 inclusive. In my earlier 1998 paper I made an 
equivalent assumption (based on the then expected real 2002/3 
figure), i.e.  that the net annual cost to the SRA would remain  
Table 2 : Support to national passenger rail services in Britain
£ million at 1999/2000 prices (approximate) 
Year   Out-turn or  Adjusted figure 
   original sum of 
   franchisees' bids 
1990/91  1000 
1991/92   1300 
1992/93  1600 
1993/94  1320 
1994/95  2540 
1995/96  2360 
1996/97  2340  (gross) 
1997/98  1940 
1998/99  1600 
1999/2000  1380 
2000/01  1210    1190 
2001/02  1100    1250 
2002/03   900    1050 
Notes:
Derived from table 4.1 in Strategic Rail Authority bulletin 
'National Rail Trends  2000-01, quarter 3', March 2001, 
converted to 1999/2000 prices by author. Allowance is also made 
from 1997/98 for revenue received by PTEs directly at £125m per 
annum.  'Gross' figure refers to payments before 'administered 
profit' for BR services in that year. For basis of 'adjusted 
figure' see text. 
unchanged.  If projections were taken from those longer-running  
franchises (such as  Virgin West Coast) continuing after 2002/03 
then a further reduction would occur. However, this would 
involve extrapolating from a limited number of possibly 
unrepresentative cases. Furthermore, doubts must also exist as 
to whether the longer-term franchises will actually perform 
according to their present schedule. While some improvement will 
certainly be expected in the case of the Virgin franchises, as 
new trains and higher speeds come into effect, further delays 
are occurring in the infrastructure upgrade, and other 
franchises in the regional grouping may well need more support 
than presently budgeted. 
Operator profitability
In order to remain in business, the franchised TOCs must attain 
an operating profit, after taking into account passenger 
revenue, franchise payments and any other income, set against 
Railtrack access and ROSCO leasing charges as well as  direct 
operating costs. A very small percentage operating margin may 
suffice, given that TOCs' capital investment is very small - a 
1% margin gives a high return on capital -  but in practice a 
somewhat bigger figure would be needed to act as a  'safety 
margin' to allow for future changes in revenue and costs, 
especially revenue uncertainty. 
The reduction in public expenditure on franchise payments to 
operators (including PTE revenues) between 1995/96 and 1999/2000 
at 1999/2000 price levels was about £980m (from table 2). 
Passenger revenue over the same period grew by £708m (15), i.e. 
around 72% of the reduction would be offset by passenger revenue 
growth. The remaining 28%, i.e. about £270m, would largely be 
covered in aggregate by the reduction in Railtrack access 
charges over this period of 2% per annum in real terms set by 
the Regulator in 1995 (at 1999/2000 prices these fell by about 
£200m between 1995/96 and 1999/2000, after the initial 8% 
reduction). Hence,  only a small part (about £70m, or 7% of the 
drop in net support) would be attributable to net cost 
reductions (or lower profit margins) by the operators.  This 
would imply a reduction in operators’ total costs - excluding 
track access charges - of around 3%. Note these calculations 
assume that operators were basing their bids on costs after the 
initial 8% reduction had been made, and were allowing for the 
cut of 2% per annum thereafter.  
This is in very marked contrast to the local bus industry, in 
which profitability has greatly improved since 1986, but very 
largely due to reduced real costs, and increased real fares 
partly offsetting passenger volume reductions (16).  As already 
noted in this paper, real revenue per passenger-km has changed 
little since privatisation, hence rail users have not suffered 
the financial losses experienced by their (lower-income, lower-
status) opposite numbers using the bus. 
Estimates by TAS, described recently by Cheek (17), suggest an 
aggregate operating profit for the 25 franchises in 1999/2000 
(or the nearest equivalent financial year - accounting  years 
vary between companies) of about £165m, profits of about £90m in 
the long-distance sector, and £115m in London & South East being 
offset by a loss of £40m in regional  (all regional operators 
apart from Scotrail losing money). It should be borne in mind, 
however, that in the last year of British Rail, 1996/97 its 
passenger train operations reported an 'administered profit' of 
£200m (or about  £215m at 1999/2000 prices), reducing the net 
financial support required from the state by an equivalent sum. 
The overall margin in 1999/2000 corresponded to about 3% of 
turnover. 
Further discussion of variations in operator profitability is 
provided by Powell (18). 
The main achievement of the TOCs in cost terms lies not 
primarily in reducing total costs but in being able to manage an 
increase in train-km of about 9% since privatisation while 
containing costs, i.e. producing a reduction of about 10% or 
more in real cost per train-km. TAS data imply a drop of about 
3% in money terms in total cost per train-km between 1996/97 and 
1999/2000 (19), which I estimate as about 11% in real terms, 
bringing down total costs by about 3%.  Given that most growth 
in service has been off-peak, using existing stock and that 
Railtrack charges vary little with train volume, one would of 
course expect the additional train-km to have a much lower unit 
cost than the previous average. 
There are also cases of TOCs which have made ‘across the board’ 
service increases in both peak and off-peak periods, associated 
with new rolling stock. Notable examples are Anglia, doubling 
the Norwich-London main line frequency to half-hourly, and 
Midland  Main Line, likewise doubling its core frequency (albeit 
with much smaller diesel multiple units, which now handle 
intermediate flows). Substantial ridership growth has occurred – 
in the MML case, about 15% in one year after an 80% growth in 
train-km (20) -  and in such cases there would appear to be an 
association between operator initiatives and passenger volume, 
although this is not very evident at the aggregate level 
indicated in DETR modelling (see above). 
The net outcome
From the viewpoint of the state, the rail industry structure set 
up from 1994/95 produced a large internal cash flow which was 
'recycled'. Railtrack and the ROSCOs made high charges to TOCs 
(resulting in the large increase in payments to passenger rail 
services shown in table 2). However, while they remained in the 
public sector, the net increase in public spending was much 
less. When other subsidiary businesses such as infrastructure 
and telecommunications companies are included, the state-owned 
rail system produced an internal ‘profit’ of about £890m per 
annum from 1994/5. However, as companies were sold off the flow 
was lost to the public sector. 
Hence, the state gained through 'one off' sales of assets, but 
lost a long-term future cash flow  of about £890m per annum. 
While a seemingly high sum was obtained for all the businesses, 
a total of about £4500m in the 1995-98 period (mostly 
represented by Railtrack and the ROSCOs) -  less cost of the 
privatisation process - this reflected a  relatively low 
price:earnings ratio of about 6:1 for the biggest businesses, 
and much lower for the infrastructure companies. Hence, if one 
assumes all other factors remaining unchanged, the £890m per 
annum cash flow  would be lost. Over 15 years this would amount 
to about £9,300m, or if discounted at 6% per annum in real terms 
(the discount rate for public sector investment appraisal). 
Thus, the state could be seen to be losing money as a result. 
Further details of this line of argument are set out in my 1998 
WCTR paper  (2) and in fuller detail  in a paper in 'Transport 
Reviews' (18). 
This loss was offset by the reduction in payments to 
franchisees, as a result of their diminishing bids (table 2). 
Taking the then expected outcome to 2002/03 and extrapolating 
this figure to the end of the 15-year period (i.e. 2010/11) it 
could be shown that the state would benefit overall, assuming 
that gains in the franchising process were wholly attributable 
to the franchisees' own actions. 
In order for this to be achieved, the greatest cost reduction 
pressure was on Railtrack, whose income derives very largely 
from rail passenger operations (over 80%) and which was in turn 
due to fall at 2% per annum following the Regulator’s decision. 
Its annual profits would have been wiped out by 2001 had it not 
succeeded in obtaining corresponding cost reductions, notably 
through contracting-out track maintenance and renewal. The TOCs 
needed to stimulate ridership in order to attain their franchise 
payment reduction targets. Increased train-km may have played a 
part in this, necessitating the lower unit costs estimated 
above.
However, it can be argued that much of the revenue gain would 
have occurred in any case due to ridership growing for the 
reasons stated above. In addition,  some further cost reductions 
might have been expected under continued BR ownership, rather 
than no efficiency gains at all. In my 1998 papers I assumed 
that a continued cost reduction by BR would have produced an 
equivalent effect.  On this basis, the net financial outcome for 
the state was very similar whether privatisation had occurred or 
continued BR ownership continued. 
In the light of further evidence, it would seem reasonable to 
assume that most of the net revenue gain would have occurred 
under continued BR ownership due to the extent to which 
ridership and revenue gain has been determined by external 
factors. In addition, the support per annum now required is 
higher in real terms than originally expected.    
A further factor is the large growth in Railtrack access charges 
permitted under the latest periodic review  by the Regulator. 
Total support payments increase by 34.5% between 2000/1 and 
2001/2 then by about 5% over RPI to 2005/6, more than reversing 
the previous reductions (21). These do not incur a direct cost 
to the TOCs, as the franchise agreements render any changes at 
periodic review a pass-through to the SRA. However, the net 
effect on the state is clearly to increase costs very 
substantially. 
Table 3 : Estimates of financial gains and losses to the state
At 1999/2000 prices, discounted to base year of 1995/96 at 6% 
per annum over 15 year period (year 1 = 1996/97, year 15 = 
2010/11). 
£ million 
Gain through sales of Railtrack, ROSCOs and other 
Companies (excluding freight)      +4537 
Less costs of privatisation process     - 648 
Initial gain         +3889 
Loss of ‘recycled profits’ from subsidiary businesses -9333 
Net outcome         -5744 
(Reduction in Railtrack income through reduced access 
charges, assuming constant from 2001    -3308) 
Reduction in support to franchisees, compared with BR 
in 1996/97, assumed constant from 2001     +9550 
(after allowing for access charge reduction   +6242) 
Net gain before effects of taxation (6242-5744)  + 798 
Taxation income to state: 
Windfall tax in 1997        + 130 
Railtrack tax payments 1996-1999     + 220 
ROSCO tax payments, £100m p.a. over 15 years   + 970 
TOC tax payments, £45m p.a. over 15 years  + 440 
Sub-total          +1760 
Overall gain to the state       +2558 
(assuming all revenue gains due to franchisees’ actions) 
             
Notes
Method used follows that set out in references 2 and 18. 
Railtrack access charges and net support to franchisees are 
assumed to be constant from 2001 (but see text) 
Railtrack tax payments are based on actual data to 1999, but 
assume no profit (or tax liability, after capital allowances) 
thereafter. 
ROSCOs and TOCs tax revenues are based on an average rate of 30% 
corporation tax on profits of £330m and £150m p.a. over the 
whole period. 
Table 3 shows the effects of assumptions made regarding net 
financial impacts on the state. The sales proceeds and franchise 
payments to date are ‘known’ figures, but clearly projecting 
over the whole 15-year period involves some speculative 
assumptions regarding stability in franchise payments and access 
charges. The most approximate element is the taxation revenue to 
the state which depends on profit obtained, assumed tax rates 
and extent of liability for tax. 
The figures as presented are probably the most favourable 
outcome that could be shown for privatisation. Given that most 
of the reduction in franchise payments is due to revenue growth 
(largely from exogenous factors) and lower access charges (as 
allowed for in the table) these factors would apply equally well 
under state ownership. The issue for debate might then be 
whether the state could have sold Railtrack for the value 
actually obtained in the light of the Regulator’s decision to 
reduce access charges, were there not some expectation of 
Railtrack’s ability to reduce costs sufficiently to remain 
profitable. 
The further review of Railtrack access charges is not covered in 
the table. This will cause very large increases in payments from 
2001, notably in the form of direct grants rather than via TOCs 
(charges to TOCs as such actually fall in 2001/2, then rise at 
4-5% p.a.). Clearly, some of these increases arise from a more 
realistic view of future cost levels, potential efficiency 
gains, and need to reinvest in the system that would also have 
applied under public ownership. However, some elements could be 
seen as related directly to privatisation – for example, the 
assumption that Railtrack would incur real interest rates of 
about  8% in raising capital, whereas substantially lower rates 
would apply to direct public borrowing : this is analogous to 
the argument applying to the funding of London Underground 
renewal by ’Public Private Partnership’ (PPP) or direct state 
borrowing). 
‘Hatfield’ and after
Data in this paper is based on annual figures up to the 
financial year 1999/2000 inclusive. However, since October 2000 
a sharp reversal in the growth trend has occurred, and major 
financial difficulties have been faced by all rail businesses. 
This stemmed from a derailment at Hatfield (on the GNER main 
line about 30 km north of London) on 17 October 2000. While the 
number of fatalities (four) was less than in other recent 
accidents, the cause was quickly identified as the fragmentation 
of a rail on a section of curved track. This potential problem 
of ‘gauge corner cracking’ was then considered to affect many 
other sections on the network, resulting the immediate 
imposition of severe speed limits and a number of temporary 
closures. Long-distance services of all operators were very 
badly disrupted. Only from the 2001 Summer timetable (21 May) 
has a normal service been restored. 
Until the Hatfield crash, strong growth in rail use had 
continued, in line with trends since 1996: immediately before 
the crash intercity revenue was up by 16% on the same period one 
year earlier. However, for the four weeks to 31 March 2001, 
intercity revenue was down 12.5% on the same period in 2000, and 
regional 0.1%, although London & South East was up 3.6% (22). 
The last figure may reflect less scope for its users to change 
their behaviour than on routes where more modal alternatives 
exist, and resumption of some underlying growth. 
Insofar as the problems are due to Railtrack, that company 
compensates the operators for loss of revenue and other effects, 
and hence the transaction  is internal to the privatised rail 
system. However, the state becomes involved due to the effect on 
future profitability (affecting franchise renewals, for 
example), and urgent cash problems faced by Railtrack : given 
its existence as the single monopoly provider, it is difficult 
to see how it could be permitted to go out of business. Under 
the revised access charging regime, a large increase would be 
due in any case, but some payments of about £1,500m have been 
brought forward to enable Railtrack to overcome short-run 
difficulties. 
While some of the problems faced by the regional TOCs were 
anticipated by a  number of industry observers, the scale of 
problems associated with Railtrack is probably beyond anyone’s 
earlier expectations.  
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